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INTRODUCTION: BUILDING CANADIAN SCIENCE 
R. A. Jarrell and Yves Gingras 
Why was the National Research Council of Canada conceived? In one sense, it 
was meant to be similar to its prototype in Britain, which evolved into the De-
partment for Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and its sibling in Aus-
tralia, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), all founded 
during World War I, ostensibly to aid the war effort. Yet, it was perceived by 
many as a means to improve Canada's capability in industrial research and de-
velopment. Throughout most of its seventy-five years , the NRC was seen in the 
latter light, as well as in many others. The ambivalence of the Canadian govern-
ment and industry toward the work of the Council's scientific laboratories is per-
haps even more profound now than at any time in its history. 
During three quarters of a century, the National Research Council has tried to 
play many roles. There was ambiguity at its birth, when it was created by order-
in-council in 1916. On the one hand, the Imperial cabinet urged that the Domin-
ions organize scientific research for the war effort. On the other hand, Canadian 
scientists and industrialists had argued, for some years, that a national institution 
was necessary to assist nascent Canadian technologies. 
Could such a council offer advice to cabinet on science policy? It was already 
obvious by 1916 that the country's elite scientific organization, the Royal Society 
of Canada, founded by Governor-General Lord Lome in 1882, could not fulfil 
that function. When advice was required, it could be had within departments. 
During the Laurier years, powerful ministers like Clifford Sifton managed to 
make decisions without reference to an external body.The foundation of the Do-
minion Observatory is an excellent example of this personal approach, as was 
the creation of the Canadian Conservation Commission which competed with 
the NRC in a federal bureaucracy power struggle (see Girard's article, below). 
The coordination of a scientific war effort was wishful thinking in 1916: Canada's 
science and technology, at least as might be applied to defeating the Central 
Powers, was too rudimentary to be organized in any meaningful way. At any 
event, when the Armistice was signed in November 1918, there was no Canadian 
1 The Australian council had much in common with the Canadian; see C.B. Schedvin, Shaping 
Science and Industry (Sydney, 1987). 
2 See R.A. Jarrell, The Origins of the Dominion Observatory, Ottawa,' Journal for the History 
of Astronomy 22 (1991), 45-53. 
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scientific war effort in place, only a few Canadian scientists involved in an indi-
vidual way and hired directly by British institutions like the Board of Invention 
and Research. The next seven decades saw a long series of attempts by the 
Council to define itself within the Canadian context. 
In the following pages, we will highlight some of the themes in the history of the 
NRC, with the understanding of the reader that such a sketch cannot be com-
prehensive and only signposts can be mentioned. The early history has its chron-
icler. A larger-scale history appeared at the half-century mark of the Council's 
history.4 The past quarter-century, possibly the most critical of all, awaits its his-
torian. Because so few historians of science have yet to focus upon Canadian in-
stitutions, the articles in the following pages can only touch upon selected 
problems in the NRC's history. The reader is directed to Donald Phillipson's ar-
ticle on NRC historiography, as well as the chronology and bibliography, con-
cluding this volume for further information on other facets of the Council's rich 
history. We will concentrate upon the last quarter-century of NRC activities. 
The history of the NRC can be divided conveniently into five phases (pace 
Phillipson, below), bearing in mind that such a schema is meant to be convenient 
and not explanatory. The first period, from 1916 to 1929, when its laboratories 
were authorized, represents the formative years in which the NRC struggled to 
define itself as an institution and to define its role with respect to possible com-
petitors. The second encompasses the period before the outbreak of World War 
II; the energies of the NRC went towards the creation of its own laboratories and 
the search for useful work for its staff. The third period, the war years (1939-45) 
saw rapid growth, an almost complete focus upon military research and secrecy. 
The post-war era appears to have two phases: from 1945 to the 1966 NRC Act, a 
much larger and far more diverse NRC, with a strong commitment to pure re-
search, reached its zenith. This was its period of greatest impact upon Canadian 
science and technology, as well as international renown. The recent decades, 
however, have been marked by uncertainty, if not a loss of direction. We will ex-
amine these periods briefly. 
Today, when we speak of the National Research Council of Canada, we tend to 
think of its laboratories, but NRC officials always reminded us of the distinction 
between the Council, an appointed body of academics, industrialists and others 
and the laboratories themselves. The Honorary Advisory Council was estab-
3 Mel Thistle, The Inner Ring: The Early History of the National Research Council of Canada 
(Toronto, 1966). 
4 Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: The NRC 1916-1966 (Toronto, 1978). 
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lished to advise the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Re-
search, a cabinet committee of those ministers most directly involved in science 
and technology. The link between the two was the minister for Trade and Com-
merce. So, as the war ended, the new council was to coordinate and to advise. 
Coordinate what? Advise about what? This was the conundrum for the early 
council, chaired by University of Toronto physiologist A.B. Macallum. 
The appointment of a council was not merely a colonial response to an Imperial 
request, as the question of technical education and the lack of industrial re-
search in Canada had been debated for some years and action urged by groups 
such as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. The most concrete attempt to 
attack the problem was made by the Royal Canadian Institute. There was no 
significant military research to coordinate during the war, but could scientific 
and industrial research be coordinated? The survey of Canadian research capa-
bilities, made by the Council in 1917, seemed to reveal a very meagre cadre of in-
dustrial researchers, although recent scholarship suggests the survey 
underestimated the real potential. Clearly, the coordination of federal govern-
ment science was out of the question - the notion of a science ministry was not 
seriously mooted until the 1960s - because of the rivalry of government depart-
ments with scientific branches, such as the Department of the Interior (and its 
successors) and the Department of Agriculture. The documents assembled by 
Thistle speak eloquently of the atmosphere of suspicion that greeted the early 
work of the Council. 
The Council insisted that it remain at some distance from government by report-
ing directly to a minister, thus circumventing departmental control, and success-
fully resisting the Civil Service Commission once it had its own employees, which 
did little to endear it to the bureaucracy. These were not easy years for what be-
came known officially in 1925 as the National Research Council. What emerged 
as the primary desire of the Council was the creation of a National Research In-
5 The 1916 terms of reference for the Council adjure it to investigate scientific and industrial re-
search in universities, government departments and in the private sphere and 'to coordinate 
these agencies so as to prevent overlapping of effort, to induce co-operation and team work, 
and to bring up a community of interest, knowledge, and mutual helpfulness...' First Annual 
Report, 1918,7. In this period, such an injunction was more hopeful than helpful. 
6 See Philip C. Enros, The "Bureau of Industrial Research and School of Specific Industries": 
The Royal Canadian Institute's Attempt at Organizing Industrial Research in Toronto, 1914-
1918,' HSTC Bulletin 7:1 (Jan. 1983), 14-26. 
7 James P. Hull and Philip C. Enros, 'Demythologizing Canadian Science and Technology: The 
History of Industrial Research and Development/ in Peter Karl Kresl, éd., Topics in Canadian 
Business (Montréal, 1988). 
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stitute. The vicissitudes of this project have been well documented (see Enros' 
article below). There were excellent practical arguments for the creation of such 
an institution - some of these arguments pre-dated the war - and we should 
note that early in the century, Canada had established a number of scientific in-
stitutions, the kinds of institutions that all self-respecting nations possessed. Par-
liamentary support for the idea was voiced by two select committees chaired by 
Hume Cronyn advocating its establishment. Although the bill to establish Coun-
cil-operated laboratories was defeated in the Senate in 1921, the concept, which 
had been a matter of faith since the first days, would remain so until the NRC's 
efforts were crowned by success with the opening of the Sussex Drive building in 
1932.8 
Apart from advising and coordinating, both fraught with political difficulties, 
what else could the NRC undertake? The two ideas that emerged were simple 
but remarkably effective: a scholarship and grant programme to assist Canadian 
universities in the production of research personnel and to support individual re-
search and the associate committee scheme to tackle specific research problems 
in a cooperative manner. The scholarship programme was an inspired method of 
intervening in higher education; there was, of course, always the potential of 
conflict with provincial governments, as education was a jealously-guarded pro-
vincial power. 
The advantage of both schemes was that neither trod upon the toes of federal 
government departments. In the case of student scholarships and research 
grants, the NRC entered virgin territory. Research in the universities was still a 
relative novelty by 1920. The reproduction of research personnel was not gen-
erally supported by universities or provincial governments. These schemes, 
which survived well into the 1970s before being removed to a different agency, 
were perhaps the way in which the NRC had its most significant impact upon the 
growth of Canadian science. At the end of NRC's administration of the pro-
gramme, nearly $100 million was being expended annually on grants and scholar-
ships. 
8 The opening of this splendid building was rendered anticlimactic by government austerity mea-
sures; for some years, the NRC could not fill the building. 
9 When the Royal Commission on Technical Education was formed before the war, the then 
Minister of Labour, W.L. Mackenzie King, took great care to reach consensus with provincial 
governments. 
10 Yves Gingras, Physics and the Rise of Scientific Research in Canada (Montreal and Kings-
ton, 1991); RA. Jarrell, The Cold Light of Dawn: The History of Canadian Astronomy: A His-
tory of Canadian Astronomy (Toronto, 1988). 
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The associate committee programme, on the other hand, was a relatively eco-
nomical means of bringing together university (and occasionally industrial) ex-
pertise to solve practical problems. The associate committee structure had a 
great influence upon the growth of scientific disciplines in Canada. They were 
flexible means to react quickly to new situations. The Associate Committee on 
Tuberculosis in the inter-war years and the wartime committee for Medical Re-
search, for example, not only served to solve urgent practical problems but also 
raised the question of an appropriate structure for funding medical research 
(see Feldberg's and Romano's articles below). Although medical research was 
not part of the original mandate for the NRC, it could thus be tackled in a practi-
cal and evolutionary manner through the medium of the associate committee up 
to the point when growth justified the creation of a whole Division of Medical 
Research (see Li's article below). Though the work of the associate committees 
is less well known than the research performed in the NRC laboratories, opened 
in 1932, it had lasting effects on the Canadian system of research. The continued 
existence almost to this day of these committees (they were abolished in 1991) 
also shows that after having won the battle for the erection of central labora-
tories in Ottawa, the NRC did not simply abandon the committee system and 
turn upon itself, but continued to be sensitive to problems raised by outside sci-
entists. In 1929, for example, the president of NRC, H.M. Tory, decided to create 
the Canadian Journal of Research to solve the problem of the diffusion of the 
growing amount of research results coming out of universities aided by NRC 
grants and scholarships, a problem brought to his attention by associate commit-
tees like the one for physics and engineering physics, and which could not be 
solved by the Royal Society of Canada. 
The inauguration of the NRC laboratories in the Depression was unpropitious. 
Had they appeared in good economic times, they might have made a greater im-
mediate impact. As it was, the research teams had to stretch to make any contri-
bution, and then often only with government contracts, such as with researches 
on wheat growing or for the RCAF in aviation technology. 
Everything changed with World War II. Industrial research immediately faded 
into the background and war research move to the fore. One important change 
11 For a useful summary of NRC associate committees, consult Donald J.C. Phillipson, Associate 
Committees of the NRCC, 1917-1975 (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada, 1983). 
12 W.E.K. Middleton, Mechanical Engineering at the NRCC, 1929-1951 (Waterloo, 1984), and 
Physics at the NRCC, 1929-1952 (Waterloo, 1979) and Norman T. Gridgeman, Biological Sci-
ences at the NRCC: the Early Years to 1952 (Waterloo, 1979). 
13 Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto, 1950). 
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was in the style of leadership of the Council; until 1939, the two presidents - who 
had replaced the earlier administrative chairmen - H.M. Tory and General 
A.G.L. McNaughton, had operated under a 'command' structure, both being 
strong, authoritarian leaders, albeit with different styles.. McNaughton's acting 
replacement as president, CJ. Mackenzie, was an engineer from academe. The 
great advantage that Mackenzie possessed, given wartime secrecy and urgency, 
was a personal relationship he developed with a powerful member of cabinet, 
fellow engineer (and American-born) CD. Howe. Wartime exigencies meant 
that the Council no longer had the luxury of discussion but had to act. For the 
most part, the personal relationship between Mackenzie and Howe during the 
war worked for the benefit of the NRC (and the country), though this was not al-
ways an unalloyed benefit.15 
The great expansion of the NRC laboratories meant new areas of science 
opened up to Canadians. Radar research was on obvious area; Canadians had 
ignored the subject before the war, although a number of countries were in-
volved in research. The arrival of a technological breakthrough - the cavity mag-
netron - was as important as the Tizard mission that brought it to the New 
World. The radar programme at the NRC absorbed a great deed of scientific 
and technical talent and led to a number of important devices, some of which 
were of value in peacetime, but there were certainly missteps and mistakes, par-
ticularly in the move from research to development to production.17 Whilst ad-
mitting that NRC research for the war effort was substantial and often very 
effective, more detailed research and closer analysis may well show that the 
results of six years' centralization of science in Canada had drawbacks. 
However, one advantage of such centralization was the concentration of young 
scientific talent; many graduate students and more mature scientists in universi-
ties and in government departments dropped their pre-war work and joined 
Council research teams to work on such tasks as sonar, code breaking, nutrition 
14 See Mel W. Thistle, (éd.), The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters (Toronto, 1975). 
15 For the positive view, consult E. Christine King, E.W.R. Steacie and Science in Canada (To-
ronto, 1989), but for balance, see David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa (To-
ronto, 1989). 
16 W.E.K. Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: the Radio Branch of the NRCC (Water-
loo, 1981) 
17 David Zimmerman, 'Radar and Research Enterprises Limited,' Ontario History 80:2 (1988), 
12142. 
18 Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (Toronto, 1950). 
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studies, mass production of explosives and aircraft icing. When the war ended, 
with the NRC complement an order of magnitude larger than in had been in 
1939, a significant number of these younger scientists remained with the NRC 
and did not return the universities, despite the burgeoning enrolments as the vet-
erans demobilized. The rapid growth of the NRC also served women scientists. 
Though some had benefitted from scholarships to train as researchers, few were 
actually employed in its laboratories. It was only with Canada's entry into the 
Second World War that the door opened for increased employment of women in 
all areas of research (see Ainley and Millar's article below). 
By 1945, a significant nuclear research programme was in place; centred on 
Montreal during the war, it possessed a first-class facility at Chalk River. Al-
though Canadians were the second nation to build successfully a nuclear reactor 
(the ZEEP in 1945), we must remember that the heart of the research team was 
not Canadian, and the leadership for some years was provided by British scien-
tists (Sir John Cockcroft and W.B.Lewis). Nonetheless, the nuclear programme 
offered a tremendous advantage to young Canadians, who eventually became the 
key personnel in the field and, like B.M. Sargent at Queen's University, formed 
other centres for nuclear research in Canada. Given Canadian expertise in 1939, 
it was most unlikely that such a relatively insignificant country should become an 
important player in the most exciting post-war scientific field. But, just as 
Canada's contribution to the war on combat and diplomatic sides propelled it 
into the league of a major players in NATO after the war, the scientific research 
programmes of the NRC ensured that Canadian science came much closer to 
approximating that of its southern neighbour and ally by participating in 'Big Sci-
ence,' even if on a smaller scale. 
The National Research Council, which had been honed into a wartime tool, was 
still at heart a civilian scientific organization. Neither the administration nor 
much of the rank and file was eager to continue this work. As a result, the mili-
tary-oriented research was spun off as the Defence Research Board in 1947, 
whilst the nuclear programme, the largest single programme in the Council labo-
ratories, became an independent Crown corporation, Atomic Energy Canada 
Ltd. (AECL), in 1952. Such was the importance of this spawn of the NRC that 
President Mackenzie left the NRC to become the president of AECL, being suc-
ceeded by E.W.R. Steacie, a McGill chemist who had joined the Council labora-
tories in 1939. The NRC that Mackenzie bequeathed to Steacie was a very 
19 Wilfrid Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto, 1965) was an early and relatively uncriti-
cal account; see, especially, Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: the History of Atomic Energy of Can-
ada Ltd. (Toronto, 1988); for Lewis' contribution, consult Ruth Fawcett, The Early Ideas on 
Nuclear Power Reactors of Wilfred Bennett Lewis,' Scientia Canadensis 10:2 (1986), 132-8. 
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different institution from the one he inherited from Gen McNaughton. First, the 
NRC was very much larger, in terms of scientific, technical and support staff 
(nearly 2700 employees), in terms of budget and in terms of physical space, with 
its extensive campus on Montreal Road. Although many researchers left for fur-
ther education, university posts and positions with private firms, many remained. 
A significant number, those who had not transferred to the DRB or AECL, were 
interested in pursuing pure research, not practical industrial problems. The war-
time radar programme, later metamorphosed into the Radio and Electrical En-
gineering Division, could simultaneously support pragmatic work on antennas 
and the new fields of radio and radar astronomy under D.W.R. McKinley and 
Arthur Covington (see Covington's article below). Gerhard Herzberg, who came 
to the University of Saskatchewan in 1935, but who migrated to the Yerkes Ob-
servatory, was lured back to the NRC to organize molecular spectroscopy. Pure 
science may well have thrived under Mackenzie during peacetime, but Steacie, 
as an academic chemist and close friend of Otto Maas, clearly had an orientation 
towards fundamental scientific researches. Otherwise, one cannot imagine, for 
example, the long-time support for work on electronic music instrumentation by 
Hugh LeCaine. 
If there was a 'Golden Age' of the National Research Council, it was the during 
the period of Steacie's presidency (he died in office in 1962). The Council over-
saw a large and diverse set of laboratories, a national programme of research 
grants for academics and scholarships for graduate students, a growing post-
doctoral fellowship scheme (see Tickner's article below), supported a large and 
complex group of Associate Committees and supported several national com-
mittees of international scientific unions. NRC laboratory positions were prized 
by university graduates, and the breadth of problems tackled by the various divi-
sions, both fundamental and practical, was greater than any other institution in 
Canada. 
It would not be difficult to argue that the post-war NRC had evolved into large 
university without students. Like the modern Canadian university, the NRC un-
dertook both pure and applied research, but there is no doubt that much of its 
agenda was internally generated. With its funding programmes, it had an enor-
mous impact upon the research agenda of the country. It is facile to speak of 
'goal displacement' (Doern's term),21 but could the NRC have evolved in any 
other way? During the 1930s, the new laboratories attracted very few corporate 
20 Gayle Young, The Sackbut Blues: Hugh Le Caine, Pioneer (Ottawa, 1989). 
21 See G. Bruce Doern, Science and Politics in Canada (Montreal and Kingston, 1973). 
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clients. The enormous demands of military research during World War II nec-
essarily put industrial research 'on hold.' But what of the post-war years? We 
must recall that well into the 1960s, the Canadian economy boomed, not just fu-
elled by primary resource industries but also by the manufacturing sector. Engi-
neering and applied science programmes in Canadian universities grew 
substantially during this period, and nearly all provinces had research councils of 
their own. And can we dismiss the fact - for it is a fact - that the larger Cana-
dian industries had been dominated by foreign companies since the 1880s? Ca-
nadian industry, whether Canadian or foreign owned, was relatively effective in 
both technology transfer and innovation during this period. There was simply 
no long queue of sizeable Canadian industries at NRC's doors asking for advice 
and assistance. 
In 1960, before the science policy movement began to make an impression, 
Steacie could argue that although Canadians had relied heavily upon British and 
American science earlier, now 
To maintain its position as an advanced industrial country, Canada must allocate to scientific re-
search and development a proportion of our resources comparable to that allocated by other ad-
vanced countries. 
The implication was that the NRC could play an important role in this agenda. 
The National Research Council may have been perceived by many as having 
downgraded the priority of industrial research during the post-war years, but 
was never idle in the field. The Technical Information Service grew apace, the 
National Science Library, founded in 1957, made material available to academ-
ics and industry. Technical information was certainly an important function of its 
successor, the Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information 
(CISTI). CISTI, housed in its new home on the Montreal Road campus by 
22 See Middleton, Physics at the NRCC, and Gridgeman, Biological Sciences at the NRCC. 
23 Frances Anderson, Olga Berseneff and Paul Dufour, 'Le développement des conseils de re-
cherche provinciaux: quelques problématiques historiographiques,, HSTC Bulletin 7 (Jan. 
1983), 27-44. 
24 J J. Brown, Ideas in Exile (Toronto, 1967), argues otherwise, but for a much closer analysis of 
the issue, see Chris De Bresson, 'Have Canadians Failed to Innovate? The Brown Thesis 
Revisited,' HSTC Bulletin 6 (1982), 10-23 and De Bresson and Brent Murray, Innovation in 
Canada (New Westminster, 1984), 2 vols. 
25 NRC, Annual Report, 1960/1961, 16. 
26 CISTI arose, in part, because of a report of the Science Council of Canada, Report No. 6: A 
Policy for Scientific and Technological Information Dissemination (Ottawa, 1969). 
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1974, had already put into place a variety of on-line computer bibliographic sys-
tems for remote users. The NRC's non-technical publication (NRC Research 
News, later Science Dimension) featured many articles on research for industry. 
Still, one of the Council's primary conduits of information, its research journals, 
remained oriented towards science. Beginning in 1929 as the Canadian Journal 
of Research, the NRC's house scientific journal had, by the mid-1970s, diversi-
fied into thirteen journals for biochemistry, botany, chemistry, chemical engi-
neering, earth sciences, geotechnical research, forestry, microbiology, physics, 
zoology and physiology and pharmacology. A decade later, they were joined by 
two more for genetics and cytology and for computational intelligence. 
The clouds began to gather in the mid-1960s. As Doern argues, the NRC had 
been treated by Parliament with either respect or benign neglect for decades, but 
with the report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the 
Glassco Commission) in 1963, trenchant criticism of the NRC's goals and prac-
tices emerged and life for the Council has never been the same. Once the Cana-
dian government 'discovered' science policy, centralization seemed to be 
inevitable, and the centralization of science would not be in the NRC. One con-
sequence of the Glassco recommendations, via a report by Dean Mackenzie, was 
the formation of the Science Secretariat, within the Privy Council Office, in 1964. 
The cabinet, whose committee on scientific and industrial research had been 
castigated by Glassco for having met rarely with little effect, now had an in-
house source of scientific advice - although on a very small scale - but for the 
NRC, which by statute had an advisory role (even if rarely exercised), there was 
now a competitor. The cancellation of the Intense Neutron Generator (ING) 
project and Queen Elizabeth II telescope on the advice of the Science Secretar-
iat demonstrated that the new organization was no idle threat. Another player 
appeared in 1966, an arm's-length national advisory board, the Science Council 
of Canada (abolished in 1992). In 1966, the new NRC Act effectively abolished 
the Council's advisory role in government science. 
The increasing bureaucratization during the Pearson government became more 
systematic early in the Trudeau regime. The Senate Special Committee on Sci-
ence Policy, masterminded by Senator Maurice Lamontagne, and the adoption 
of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) methodology by govern-
ment departments at the beginning of the 1970s, were even greater threats to the 
traditional way of organizing scientific activity. The Lamontagne report, which 
reviewed the various models of research and development (R & D), clearly 
leaned towards more centralized government control, whilst falling short of 
27 See the 4 volumes of A Science Policy for Canada, Report of the Senate Special Committee 
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French or Soviet centralization, was certainly much more controlled than the 
laxer American model. Since the Glassco and Lamontagne reports, government 
circles believed that the NRC had fallen victim of 'goal displacement,' that it no 
longer concentrated upon industrial research. The government reforms of the 
early 1970s would, presumably, force the NRC back on track. 
This was the bind that the Council was in. If it were a university in disguise, how 
could it justify its existence? And how could it proffer industrial advice if few de-
sired it? The conundrum was 'solved' by successive governments by stripping the 
NRC of its functions and by pressing it to 'return' to its original mission of assist-
ing industrial science. One method of persuasion was to re-orient the Council 
through its appointments. In 1960, the Honorary Advisory Council consisted of 
President Steacie, three of his vice-presidents (one doubling as chair of the Med-
ical Research Council), the retired president, CJ. Mackenzie, fourteen univer-
sity members, one member representing labour and one from industry! By 1975, 
W.G. Schneider presided over a council with four vice-presidents and a secretary 
from the NRC, eight university members and nine from the private sector. By 
1985, the new order was thoroughly evident: Larkin Kerwin's council had seven 
NRC officers, four university members, one government member and twelve 
from the private sector. 
Steacie did not live to see the increasing pressures for change. His successors, 
B.G. Ballard and W.G. Schneider, both staff members who had come up through 
the ranks, were perhaps not prepared for the new environment. Schneider took 
most of the heat and had to defend his organization before the Senate Special 
Committee. He recognized that some accommodation would have to be made 
and on his assumption of office, the administration was re-organized into three 
broad categories - intramural research, grants and scholarships, industrial re-
search and promotion - along with the appointment of a délégué-général to ad-
vise the president on policy and planning. He was aware that forces were abroad 
that could dismantle his domain: 
In discussions on science policies it is frequently stated that a disproportionate amount of research 
in Canada is carried out in federal government laboratories, an inference which is quite misleading 
29 and totally unfounded. 
on Science, Policy (Ottawa, 1970-74). For a critique, consult F. Ronald Hayes, The Chaining of 
Prometheus: Evolution of a Power Structure for Canadian Science (Toronto, 1973). 
28 The francophone participation in those three periods was four, five and six members, respec-
tively. The 1985 council had one woman. 
29 NRC, Report of the President, 1968/1969,10. 
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This was, in fact, an argument used by his predecessors. He argued that in a 
country with a resource-intensive economy, such imbalances are natural and that 
an analysis of other developed nations would not show a significant difference 
from the Canadian pattern of state-performed research. Schneider took pains 
in his annual reports to argue for a greater government expenditure on science 
and technology. 
One consequence of the insertion of the science policy debate into the NRC's 
management style was a greater effort, in annual reports, to justify the Council's 
expenditures. At the time the Senate Special Committee's report was appearing, 
the President's Report noted that the allocation of NRC funds was based upon 
priorities. Funding fell into two major areas: 
A. To perform and support research for economic, social and cultural benefits 
to Canadians' (87%) 
-22% for industry (industrial technology and grants) 
-8% for societal problems (e.g. fire codes, transport) 
-50% to acquire new knowledge (laboratories, grants, facilities) 
-7% manpower training and career development 
B. To transfer the results of NRC research and scientific information generally 
to industry, other government agencies and the public sector to ensure that de-
sirable social and economic benefits are available to Canadians' (13%) 
-9% general scientific information (Associate Committees, conferences, infor-
mation services, etc.) 
-4% scientific data and services (standards, codes, etc) 
-0.2% Canadian Patents and Development Ltd 
When Larkin Kerwin assumed the presidency, the justification process merged 
with the government's administrative mind-set to result in a five-year plan. The 
first NRC five-year plan, adopted in 1980, emphasized industrial research and 
development. Six broad categories would be targeted: industrial R & D , regional 
development, energy, core research, social impact studies and effectiveness (i.e. 
30 For further thoughts on government and science, see W.G. Schneider, 'The Role of Govern-
ment as Patron and User of Science and Technology,' Science Forum 6:1 (Feb. 1973), 12-16. 
31 See, especially, NRC, Report of the President, 1975/1976,10-21. 
32 NRC, Report of the President, 1971/1972,10-11. 
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improvements in administration). On the one hand, an inordinate amoimt of 
time seemed to be invested in what could be interpreted as wrong-headed 'sovi-
etization,' but the NRC had to demonstrate its commitment to industrial R&D 
for self-preservation. Despite problems in implementation due to economic re-
cession in the early 1980s, some of the goals were achieved and a second five-
year plan followed for the second half of the decade. Did these plans succeed? 
One measure was the apparently greater expenditure on industrial R & D re-
lated science. In 1985/86, the general expenditure pattern was as follows: 
Natural Science & Engineering $ 37,162,000 
Social and Economic Problems $ 47,554,000 
Industrial Innovation/Development $182,621,000 
Standards $ 7,918,000 
Administration $ 44,393,000 
Employee Benefits $ 19,231,000 
Total $408,025,000 
Note, however, that the accounting categories themselves had changed. In 1971, 
a certain amount of industry-related R & D would be included under 'new 
knowledge.' Of the 1985-86 total, $261,840,000 was expended on NRC labora-
tories (including administration). The remainder, 35% of the total, was extramu-
ral expenditure: $89,200,000 on external contracts, $30,200,000 for university 
contracts (mostly TRIUMF) and $26,700,000 to national facilities, other agen-
cies and governments. By 1988/89, the extramural expenditure had risen margin-
ally to 37%. Despite the increased emphasis upon joint ventures with industry 
and increased extramural expenditure, over $300 million was spent in-house by 
1989. For nearly sixty years, the NRC believed that its laboratories played a role 
that universities could not perform; in reviewing an OECD report on national 
laboratories, President Kerwin could still argue, in 1989, that: 
NRC is cited in particular for our fundamental or long-term research which universities are not as 
33 well equipped to do because of teaching commitments and other circumstances. 
Thus, the ideal of the university without classes still exists. 
The leadership of the NRC, and the degree to which it was bureaucratized, is 
also an indication of how much change was imposed by external forces. In 
33 NRC, Annual Report, 1988/1989,7. 
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Steacie's day, the NRC required only three vice-presidents. The total number of 
employees varied little over the years, from just under 3200 in 1967 to 3275 in 
1989. Yet, by 1985, the Council had eight people at the vice-presidential level. 
The expenditure on administration rose from 8% of the budget in 1972 to 10% in 
1988. Yet, one could argue that the NRC of the 1980s was a far more complex 
operation than it was in Steacie's day. In 1985, the research work was overseen 
by a senior vice-president, with one associate vice-president superintending the 
Atlantic Research Laboratory, the Herzberg Institute of Astrophysics and the 
divisions of Space, Physics and Chemistry, another associate vice-president in 
charge of engineering divisions (Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineer-
ing, Energy) and institutes (Industrial Materials Research Institute, Institute of 
Marine Dynamics and the National Aeronautical Establishment). A second vice-
president controlled the Biological Sciences Division, Plant Biotechnology Insti-
tute, Biotechnology Research Institute and the Biotechnology Network. A third 
vice-president handled technology transfer departments such as CISTI. The se-
nior vice-president was also responsible for miscellaneous divisions such as na-
tional facilities (TRIUMF, Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope, Canadian Institute 
for Industrial Technology, etc.) 
All through the post-war years, the NRC had developed new scientific fields by 
way of pure research, in medical science (such as studies of antibodies and can-
cer), in nuclear studies (with fusion research), in fundamental biology (DNA 
studies and molecular genetics in general), in chemistry (spectroscopy and vita-
mins) to cite only a few examples. But for all the external complaints, the Coun-
cil laboratories carried on a rich variety of pragmatic programmes with vigour. 
In the life sciences, some projects were essentially agricultural (see Estey's arti-
cle, below), others dealt with food technology, fungi, lichens, Irish Moss cultiva-
tion along with human physiology and psychology. The Division of Building 
Research looked into permafrost construction, insulation, avalanche protection, 
building codes and, during the energy 'crisis' of the 1970s, alternative energy 
sources. Transportation technologies were always essential elements of Council 
research, ranging over icing of railway switches, breakwater construction and 
road construction. The National Aeronautical Establishment at Uplands Airport 
in Ottawa, equipped with Canada's largest windtunnel, performed a wide variety 
of experiments for building and transport concerns. NRC engineers studied lu-
bricants, power transmission, fuel efficiency, windmills, bird hazards to aircraft, 
wave dynamics and a number of standards problems. Industries were served by 
research into fabrics, advanced materials, electronics, chemical engineering, etc. 
Even the complaint that NRC had placed too much emphasis upon pure science 
could not always be laid directly at its door; in the case of astronomy, the govern-
ment decided to dismantle the Dominion Observatories Branch of the Depart-
ment of Energy, Mines and Resources in 1970 and transfer all of astronomy to 
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the Council. From that time, Canada's time service - by then a problem in 
physics rather than astronomy - became an NRC section, whilst the optical and 
radio astronomers, who could hardly be expected to contribute to industrial R & 
D, were brought into one organization (eventually the Herzberg Institute of As-
trophysics). On the one hand, the NRC was clearly proud of this research group, 
with its world-renowned Dominion Astrophysical Observatory and one of the 
most important radio telescopes at the Algonquin Radio Observatory. Many ar-
ticles on NRC astronomical work appeared in Science Dimension, for astronomy 
appeals greatly to the public. On the other hand, several millions of dollars ex-
pended annually on something so lacking in practicality was potentially an em-
barrassment. There is no doubt that morale amongst the NRC astronomers 
ebbed substantially over the years as budgets became tighter and conflicting de-
mands vied for those fewer resources. 
During all this period, the National Research Council did not neglect its external 
clientele and the Associate Committee system needs special mention. The fol-
lowing table shows the extent of the kinds of problem areas tackled by Associate 
Committees in Schneider's early days as president. 
NRC ASSOCIATE COMMITTEES 197035 
Aerodynamics 
Aeronautical Structures and Materi-
als 




Bird Hazards to Aircraft 
Computers 
Crystallography 
Culture Collections & Taxonomy of 
Microorganisms 
Earthquake Engineering 
Fats and Oils 
Forest Fire Protection 
Geodesy and Geophysics 
34 Consult Jarrell, Cold Light of Dawn. 





National Building Code 
National Fire Codes 
Plasma Physics 
Propulsion 








In all, twenty-eight Associate Committees along with dozens of sub-committees 
and task forces involved 486 scientists from across Canada. Nearly 40% were 
government researchers, with just over a quarter coming from the private sector. 
Given Canada's interest in the geosciences, the Associate Committee for Geod-
esy and Geophysics was the most complex, with subcommittees for aeronomy, 
exploration geophysics, geodesy, geodynamics, glaciers, geomagnetism, gravity, 
hydrology, isotope studies and geochronology, meteorology and atmospheric sci-
ences, seismology and volcanology. 
Although the system seemed quite effective, Schneider voiced second thoughts: 
Since Associate Committees were first introduced by NRC, Canada has become a scientifically so-
phisticated country and there are other agencies of government, as well as scientific and profes-
sional societies, that are capable of taking much greater responsibility for some of the roles and 
activities of Associate Committees. These roles are being examined and assessed with a view to clar-
ifying them and formulating guidelines for the assignment of tasks and responsibilities when Com-
mittees are established. 
This may well have been a response to the external criticism of the NRC's role in 
so many facets of Canadian science. Yet, the system was mutually beneficial for 
NRC and non-NRC scientists alike and, although some committees folded, new 
ones took their place. By 1985, twenty-five Associate Committees existed, along 
with fifty subcommittees, with some 1000 members. Other committees enrolled 
both NRC and outside scientists, especially the national committees of the inter-
national scientific unions to which Canada subscribed. These grew from twenty-
nine in 1970 to fifty by 1985. NRC had also participated in large-scale 
international cooperative research programmes such as the International Geo-
physical Year, the International Hydrological Decade, the International Biologi-
cal Programme and the Global Atmospheric Research Programme. By 1985, in 
addition to all the above, eleven advisory committees for various laboratories 
and projects, three divisional review committees and six council standing com-
mittees kept NRC staff occupied. 
A quarter-century of science policy and increasing government intervention into 
Council affairs has certainly taken its toll. Despite continuing large budgets, the 
NRC's responsibilities were whittled away. The postdoctoral fellowship pro-
gramme was closed down, the Medical Research Council (MRC) became inde-
pendent in 1960 and the Council's earliest function, its grants and scholarships 
programmes (a significant portion of the NRC budget), passed to a separate 
agency, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) in 
36 NRC, Report of the President, 1970/1971,36. 
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1978.. The Space Science Office, with its budget, was removed in the late 1980s 
to form an independent Canadian Space Agency, directed by Larkin Kerwin. In 
1991, under Kerwin's successor Pierre Perron, the associate committee system 
came to an end. Recent developments suggest even further trimming of budgets 
and government control of research agendas. 
Will the NRC perform a leadership role in Canadian R & D in future? Whether 
it does survive will depend upon the adroitness of its management to reorganize 
it to adapt to the rapidly changing political and economic environment of the 
early twenty-first century. We can only reflect upon seventy-five years of history -
well documented by the articles in this collection - and conclude that the Na-
tional Research Council of Canada, through its many contributions, has truly 
helped to build Canadian science. 
